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`THIRD GENERATION' RIGHTS: IS THERE ROOM FOR
HYBRID CONSTRUCTS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
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Human rights, which are by nature dynamic and constantly evolv-
ing, need to accommodate new rights, just as each generation should
contribute to their evolution, in keeping with the aspirations and
values of the time.1
1 Introduction
International human rights law is not static; evolution of human rights is at the
heart of the system. United Nations human rights institutions' mandates require
them to develop, as well as protect and promote, rights. Since the beginning
of the modern human rights era, individual rights and the human rights system
have constantly evolved. Initially, ideological battles centred upon the tensions
between and ideological divisions underpinning Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The next significant evolution occurred
with the advent of Third Generation Rights, also known as `Collective Rights' or
`Peoples Rights'.2 Those rights were rooted in post-colonial discourses, drawing
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on the newly decolonised states' mosaic of imperial experiences. The most recent
development is the second wave of Third Generation Rights. Unlike the first
wave, these newer rights cannot be understood as a reaction to colonialism;
instead, the concept of `hybridity' can help explain the ideologies upon which
they are based, the processes through which they are created as well as the rights
themselves.
Hybridity occurs where there is resistance to domination that occurs through
colonisation, occupation, intervention, or other power imbalances. Resistance
comes from the `local', used not in the parochial sense but to mean the space
created `in which everyday practices are used'. The local may exist at the
national, transnational or global levels.3 Hybridity, then, is not based upon
the merging of two different, binary entities; rather, it occurs through the
meeting of those entities and the processes of resistance and adaptation on
both sides. What emerges is not a mixing of the two, but a third entity that
challenges the dominant—substantively or ideologically—while simultaneously
incorporating norms and values from both. It goes beyond `mimicry' or repetition
of the dominant order, instead becoming `an uncertainty which fixes the colonial
subject as a partial presence'.4 This lens moves the discourse and understanding
away from `unhelpful binaries' and `towards thinking about the multiplicity of
outcomes thatmight occur when two entities meet and interact.'5 The interaction
is key, particularly the different level of resistance within each relationship
resulting in challenges to the dominant framework that necessarily incorporate
ideas and norms from the local and external entities.
Hybridity is a relatively underdeveloped area within legal scholarship.
Throughout this article, I develop and apply a framework for understanding
hybridity and its role and impact within the international arena. The framework
consists of three interconnected elements. Firstly, hybridity is a theory that en-
ables understanding of identities, providing a lens through which cultures may
be viewed. Hybridity, or hybridisation, is also a process through which identities
and cultures are forged, with a `multiplicity of outcomes' that depend on `complex
and context-specific realities'.6 Traditionally, that process is viewed as occurring
3
O Richmond & A Mitchell, `Introduction' in O Richmond & A Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of
Peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism (2012) 11.
4
H K Bhabha, The Location of Culture (1994) 123.
5
J H Peterson, `A Conceptual Unpacking Of Hybridity: Accounting For Notions Of Power,
Politics And Progress In Analyses Of Aid-Driven Interfaces' (2012) 7(2) Journal of Peacebuilding
& Development 9, 12.
6
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within postcolonial, or other formerly occupied or dominated, societies. Yet,
the process of constructing identities, ideologies and objectives also takes place
within the international arena. Lastly, hybridity is an entity in terms of the con-
structs that emerge based on the theory and resulting from the process. All three
elements are integral for understanding international human rights law's current
evolutionary cycle.
The impact of non-Western constructs on international law has traditionally
been explored through post-Marxist discourses, particularly post-colonialism.
Hybridity is a relatively new lens through which these issues can be viewed.
The theory has roots within classics and the humanities, but has only recently
been applied within social sciences and legal frameworks, albeit using case
studies from the local, national or regional level. It is clear that ideological,
political, and legal discourses are crucial for understanding current changes to,
or attempts to change, international human rights law. The shift in global power
and politics has underscored the need to represent hybrid constructs within
international law. The international legal system is moving in this direction,
with peace-building and interventions, for example, beginning to represent
heterogeneous norms that incorporate African,7 Asian8 and Islamic9 ideologies
and values on responsibilities, communities and social justice.
Significant literature has explored the ideologies underpinning international
human rights law, particularly in relation to the three categories, or `generations',
of rights. Much has also been written on the expansion of human rights and the
resultant impact on the system as a whole. However, legal scholarship is yet to
address systematically the recent second wave of Third Generation Rights. The
practical effect is being felt across the international human rights system, with
time and resources being allocated to discussions, declarations, resolutions and
Special Procedures mandates aimed at developing these newer rights. Those
developments are not being examined or discussed within the academy, let alone
analysed from an interdisciplinary perspective. There is an obvious need to
understand the rights themselves, the reasons that they are being promoted, and
the ideologies upon which they are built.
Previous legal scholarship on Third Generation Rights confined discussions
7
See e.g. C Heyns, `The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter' (2004) 108
Penn State Law Review 679.
8
See e.g. B Kausikan, `Asia's Different Standard' (1993) 92 Foreign Policy 24.
9
See e.g. J Morgan-Foster, `Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the
International Human RightsMovement' (2005) 8 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal
67.
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to substantive rights stemming from post-colonialism.10 The recent increase of
this category of rights, and themethods used to introduce them into international
human rights law, necessitates new research and analysis. If Third Generation
Rights are a method for expanding international human rights law, a thorough,
interdisciplinary analysis needs to take place. Another explanation is that states
promoting ThirdGeneration Rights are attempting to dilute this area of law. That
aim would stem from political objectives unrelated to protecting and promoting
human rights. If Third Generation Rights are being used to undermine the
resources available for traditional rights, and to muddy the water of what
constitutes a right, then it is imperative to address that issue.
This article has three main aims: first, to develop a framework for under-
standing hybridity at the international level; second, to explore the ways in which
hybridity operates within the international arena, specifically on international
human rights law; and third, to address the current literature gap on the newwave
of Third Generation Rights. By advancing the theoretical model, the article de-
velops the ways in which hybridity is used to understand practical developments
at the international level. It widens the debate by drawing on a broad range of
hybridity literature from across various disciplines in order to produce theories
that are then applied to new Third Generation Rights. The article also demon-
strates the pressing need to understand how hybrid rights are impacting upon the
international human rights system.
2 Hybridity
Hybridity occurs within what Bhabha calls the `Third Space'11 that exists between
the dominant and the dominated, the coloniser and the colonised. That space
may be a metaphor or a place; it is the `contact zone'12 produced by the colonial,
or other power-imbalanced, relationship. An alternative both to post-colonial
discourses and globalisation,13 to cultural relativism and universalism, hybridity
goes beyond the binaries that exist within those competing theories and instead
10
See e.g. P Alston, `A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?' (1982) 29Netherlands International Law Review
307; G Triggs, `The Rights of ``Peoples'' and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?', in J
Crawford (ed), The Rights Of Peoples (1988) 141.
11
Bhabha, above n 4; R C Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (1995) 37.
12
B Ashcroft, G Griffiths & H Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (2000) 118.
13
See generally A J Paolini,Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity and International Relations
(1999), particularly the methodology contained within 5-8.
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explores the relationship between the two entities and `the multiplicity of out-
comes that might occur'.14 Instead of focusing on the `fact' of post-colonialism,
hybridity results from the `markedly unbalanced relationship' between the dom-
inated and the dominant.15 It recognises that intertwining between the local and
the foreign, the dominant and the weak, results in construction of a third identity
that does more than simply mix the components. Hybridity is `a site for transfor-
mation and change where fixed identities based on essentialisms are called into
question.'16 Identities are forged based on ideologies, customs, values and norms
emanating from, but not exclusive to, both entities as well as the intertwining
of heritages. The hybrid identity is more than the sum total of its parts—it is a
wholly new construct created through the interaction between two binaries and
the resistance that occurs during that meeting.
Universalists, often advancing a globalisation theory, `assume an increasing
homogenization of the world';17 while cultural relativists, frequently relying on
post-colonial discourses, `posit notions of difference and resistance'18 in the re-
lationships between the global North and South. Hybridity within international
and transnational relationships is viewed through a markedly different lens to
that previously adopted by scholars of political science, post-colonialism, clas-
sics and law who examine relationships between dominant and dominated ac-
tors. Rather than viewing interactions as top-down impositions, hybridity the-
ories are used to understand and interpret relationships that occur at the `local'
level.19 This includes, but is not limited to, the relationship between actors, ide-
ologies and institutions. It examines the impact that norms and cultures have
on national, regional and international systems. Typically, this occurs through
power relationships. Although hybridity has been used primarily in relation to
case studies from the national level, such as state-building and peace-building,
14
Peterson, above n 5, 12.
15
J Kurotti & J Nyman, `Introduction: Hybridity Today', in J Kuortti & J Nyman (eds), Reconstructing
Hybridity: Post-Colonial Studies in Transition (2007) 2.
16
Ibid, 3.
17
Paolini, above n 13, 6.
18
Ibid, 5.
19
Richmond & Mitchell redefine the word `local' as referring to `the terrain in which everyday
practices are used within (and in order to create) a local space. In this sense, the local is not to
be essentialized or parochialized; it refers to a space that is, in a sense, transversal, transnational
and even global, or at least a feature of most human societies. Whilst the local is the realm in
which everyday activities emerge and unfold, a locale is a unique local space conditioned by the
everyday traditions, practices, values, identities and moral, ethical or ``radical'' (i.e., root) sources
of the groups in question.' Richmond & Mitchell, above n 3, 11.
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recent attempts have been made to apply the theory to international develop-
ments. Understanding hybridity enables scholars to explore national, regional
and international developments through an alternative lens—one that seeks to
avoid polarising and being polarised.
As a theory, hybridity provides a lens through which ideologies, norms and
values may be viewed. Theories may also be an input within the international
arena. This occurs when governments, or their delegates, demonstrate that
their positions have been informed by the hybridity theory. That may occur
within regional groups and political blocs, when collective aims and ideologies are
constructed, or may take place within international institutions. Post-colonialist
theories frequently have been heard at UN human rights bodies. Abebe, the First
Secretary at the PermanentMission of Ethiopia inGeneva, relies upon and adopts
post-colonial discourses in his scholarship.20 Those views are then incorporated
into statementsmade on behalf of his government. Other statements delivered by
state delegates may be couched in the language of postcolonial discourses rather
than relying directly on those theories: China has referred to human rights at
as a `neo-colonial tool of oppression',21 for example, while Cuba complained of
`imperialism' within UN human rights bodies.22 Theories, then, do not operate
only at the abstract level but become inputs within the international arena.
Discourses based on hybridity theories are beginning to be adopted within oral
statements made within, and reports given to, the UN Human Rights Council.
As will be demonstrated with reference to the development of second wave
Third Generation Rights, hybridity theories are present within the language of
resolutions, decisions and reports on the new rights as well as discussions within
UN bodies.23
As a process, hybridity occurs within the Third Space—something that is
still being defined and applied within post-colonial studies and across a broad
range of disciplines.24 Bhabha's `Third Space' is a metaphor for the meeting
of cultures—where the colonised and coloniser intertwine and from where the
distinct hybrid identity emerges.25 Bhabha, at times, also used the Third Space as
20
See generally A M Abebe, `Of shaming and bargaining: African states and the universal periodic
review of the United Nations Human Rights Council' (2009) 9(1) Human Rights LR 1.
21
P Alston, `Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN
Human Rights Council' (2006) 7Melbourne JIL 205-206.
22
For Cuban delegate's oral remarks, see CHR, `Commission on Human Rights opens Sixty-First
Session', UN Doc HR/CN/1107, 14 March 2005.
23
See section 4 (below).
24
See generally K Ikas & G Wagner (eds), Communicating in The Third Space (2009).
25
Bhabha, above n 4, 218.
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a place, although those uses were confined to the local, predominantly national,
level. Traditionally, that Third Space is viewed as existing within postcolonial
societies. Yet, the construction of identities, ideologies and objectives also takes
place within the international arena. The Third Space may be mapped onto the
international level both as a metaphor and as a place. International institutions,
in terms of formal bodies and the place that they provide for like-minded states
to meet within regional groups and political blocs, provide a physical Third
Space for the construction of hybrid norms, values and ideologies. Hybridity
as a process may also be viewed as the way inputs are converted into outputs.
Within the international human rights system, the conversion process takes place
through intergovernmental negotiations and through coalition-building to form
a majority for voting purposes.26 Both of those conversion processes require
inputs to be hybridised, for countries to set out their ideologies, which meet and
resist one another, in order to forge new constructions that will be acceptable to
the negotiating states.
As an entity, hybridity may exist within tangible matters including art,
literature, language and, indeed, law. At the international level, hybrid entities
based on theories and processes include: certain international criminal courts
and tribunals;27 aspects of some international instruments; and the second wave
of Third Generation Rights.28 In many respects, it is easier to demonstrate
hybridity as an entity owing to its tangible nature, although this third element is
not of any greater or lesser importance than hybridity as a theory or as a process.
All three elements—theory, process and entity—are necessary for under-
standing how hybridity operates at the international level. The elements in-
terconnect and interact with one another, demonstrating that hybridity cannot
solely be used as an abstract concept or as a lens through which matters are
viewed. The theory of hybridity is at a relatively early stage of its development
in terms of when and how it is applied by legal scholars and political scientists.
Its importance has been recognised by scholars such as Said, who insists that hy-
bridity is `the essential idea for the revolutionary realities today'.29 Revolutions
occur throughout the world, at the local, national, regional and international lev-
26
See generally R Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A critique and early
assessment (2013) 114-115.
27
Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia.
28
Examples include the right to international solidarity and the right to a democratic and equitable
international order.
29
E Said, Culture and Imperialism (1993) 317.
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els. Events within the international arena demonstrate a current revolution re-
garding the Global Southmoving away from postcolonial discourses and towards
ensuring that their own, heterogeneous, norms, values and identities are recog-
nised within international law.
Although first developed within postcolonial studies,30 with many theorists
from that discipline insisting that hybridity only applies to colonial and postcolo-
nial relationships,31 there is increasingmovement towards recognising hybridity's
interdisciplinary roots and application. Political scientists have adopted and ex-
tended that analysis to include all cultures and ideologies. Whereas previous im-
position of Western constructs occurred without systematic analysis about the
impact on indigenous populations, there has been growing recognition of the
need to assess the effect at the local level.32 Political scientists apply hybridity
to issues such as peace-building,33 interventions,34 state-building,35 and interna-
tional criminal courts.36 Those are all case studies that demonstrate that nothing
is purely local or purely international.37 Hybridity, then, is raised within the con-
text of specific circumstances, with theorists combining individual case studies to
draw broader conclusions, including about how events at the national and even
regional levels inform the international discourse. Hybridity research within le-
gal scholarship follows similar patterns, using events at the national or regional
levels to illustrate and inform research findings. Applying the framework set out
above to case studies at the international level, I shall demonstrate how the three
elements, combined, can be used to understand how hybridity operates within,
and impacts upon, the international arena.
Throughout modern international law, many states were unable to present
their norms and ideologies within international institutions.38 Since the end of
the Cold War, and increasingly since the turn of the Millennium, states from the
30
See e.g. Bhabha, above n 4; Young, above n 11.
31
See generally Kuortti & Nyman, above n 15, 2
32
See generally R MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid forms of peace
(2011).
33
See e.g. Richmond & Mitchell, above n 3.
34
See e.g. RMacGinty, `Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace'
(2010) 41(4) Security Dialogue 391.
35
See e.g. K PClements, et al, `State Building Reconsidered: TheRole ofHybridity in the Formation
of Political Order' (2007) 59(1) Political Science 45.
36
See e.g. O Martin-Ortega & J Herman, `Hybrid Tribunals: Interaction and Resistance in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Cambodia', in Richmond & Mitchell, above n 3, 73.
37
See generally MacGinty, above n 33.
38
See generally A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004).
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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), alongside regional allies from Africa, Asia and Latin America, have sought
greater representation of their cultures.39 Hybridity is a key method by which
African states, and more generally the `Third World',40 are able to move away
from their former consignment to the margins within the international arena.
Rather than the developing world being restricted to postcolonial discourses at
the international level, and thus promoting ideologies formed as a direct response
to colonial experiences, those states, groups and blocs are now promoting hybrid
constructs that represent national ideologies based on identities forged within
Bhabha's `Third Space'. With the increase in power and strength of developing
countries and former colonies, there has been increasing movement away from
postcolonial discourses and towards promoting hybrid constructs. Those ideas
are beginning to affect the work of international human rights bodies, financial
institutions, courts and tribunals.
3 Hybridity and international human rights law
International human rights law provides the perfect canvas from which to draw
broader conclusions about hybridity's impact on international law. The most
recent wave or category of human rights are predominantly created and pro-
moted by states from the Global South, particularly from Africa and Asia. Those
states' national ideologies, norms and cultures focus on responsibilities rather
than rights41—differences clearly illustrated when contrasting the African and
European regional human rights treaties andmechanisms.42 Those countries' use
of the human rights system, with its traditional individual-centred focus, is a stark
example of the intertwining of national cultures and norms with the dominant,
Westernmechanisms and framework. By engagingwith the system of `rights', and
by seeking to promote their own objectives within that framework, states from
the Global South are using hybridity theories to inform their actions and to create
processes and constructs that both meet and challenge the dominant ideology.
39
See generally M Nowak et al, `UN Human Rights Council in Crisis—Proposals to Enhance the
Effectiveness of the Council', in W Benedek et al (eds), European Yearbook on Human Rights (2011)
41, 58-59.
40
Paolini, above n 13, 4.
41
See generally B Obinna Okere, `The Protection of Human Rights and the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems',
(1984) 6(2) Human Rights Quarterly 141; Kausikan, above n 8.
42
See generally Obinna Okere, above n 41.
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Collective rights are often cited as examples of hybridity within international
law; yet those rights were a direct response to colonialism rather than represent-
ing states' own values. They introduced a third category of human rights that
complemented, rather than challenged, Civil and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. The first wave of Third Generation Rights has re-
cently been followed by a second wave of `rights' rooted in hybrid constructs
rather than postcolonial discourses. These newer rights are sometimes in direct
conflict with existing ways of understanding human rights. Rights are hybrid not
only in terms of their substance, subjects and scope, but also in terms of the areas
that they seek to bring into the human rights system. As such, it is necessary to
examine the latest evolution of human rights in order to determine whether—
despite the clear need to enable hybridity as a process—there is room for these
constructs within international human rights law.
In terms of the substance of human rights, dominant ideologies stemmed
initially from the West (Civil and Political Rights), quickly followed by Soviet
notions of rights (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). From the Universal
Declaration, in 1948, dominant ideologies have been at the fore in international
human rights law's development.43 Until recently, decolonised and developing
states, alongside allies from the Non-Aligned Movement,44 have promoted a
`Third Generation' of rights.45 The first wave of Third Generation Rights focused
on ensuring rights directly stemming from colonial experiences—most notably
rights to self-determination, development and permanent sovereignty over
resources.46 Those rights are rooted in traditional postcolonial discourses that
oppose imperialism and further an `anticolonial nationalism'.47 The Fanonian
Framework, for example, insists on resistance and rejection of the dominant
imperialist—Western—culture, language and identity, amongst others, in order
to realise decolonised states' national interests.48
Current legal, political and ideological battles at the UN, where states are
seeking to impact and shape international human rights law, demonstrate that
43
GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1984, `Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.
44
NAM developed from the Asian-African Conference, a political gathering held in Bandung,
Indonesia, in April 1955. The conference was convened in part due to frustration by many newly
independent countries unable to secure UN membership due to Cold War politics. The two
then-superpowers refused to admit states seen as belonging to the other camp.
45
See generally B Algan, `Rethinking ``Third Generation'' Human Rights', 2004 (1(1) Ankara Law
Review 121.
46
See e.g. Weston, above n 2.
47
See generally A Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957).
48
See generally F Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (1952); F Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1968).
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traditional postcolonial discourses are being complemented by, or replaced with,
hybridity. Those battles are following a markedly different pattern than occurred
during the creation of collective rights. Hybridity is focused on a less oppositional
stance than traditional post-colonial discourses;49 it recognises a more `syncretic
dynamic' between the coloniser and the colonised, or the dominant and the
dominated.50 It is a process of `engagement with' rather than `opposition to'. That
is clearly seen in the way that states from the Global South are using the human
rights system, based on the dominant ideology, to further their own constructs
and ideologies. The first wave of ThirdGeneration Rights required the previously
individual-centred system to change radically in order to include collective rights.
Hybrid rights are less oppositional, because they utilise the existing human rights
framework in order to promote norms not previously incorporated within that
system.
Whereas rights within each of the three traditional categories—Civil and
Political; Economic, Social and Cultural; and Collective—largely conform to
their respective ideologies, hybrid rights draw upon different norms and values
depending on the states involvedwith the input, conversion and output processes.
The theory, process and entity within each of these new rights are different
owing to the actors, ideologies, relationships and resistance varying within every
context. Hybridity provides a `key analytical tool' for examining each right
because it `allows for a heightened understanding of differences' between each
case study.51
The impact of hybridity, as theory, process and entity, at the international
level depends on two distinct factors: (1) the impact of states' hybrid identities,
created at the national level, within the international arena; and (2) the construc-
tion of hybrid identities through `Third Space' fora within the international arena.
States, particularly fromAfrica, Asia and Latin America, use political blocs and in-
ternational institutions to further their own ideologies and objectives as well as
to construct hybrid identities and aims at the international level. Political blocs
and international institutions provide arenas within which states from the Global
South can exercise collective power.52 Whereas such fora previously were used
49
See e.g. H K Bhabha, `Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under
a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817', (1985) 12 Critical Inquiry 144, 152-153; G C Spivak, `Subaltern
Studies: DeconstructingHistiography' in RGuha (ed), Subaltern Studies IV:Writings on South Asian
History and Society (1985) 5.
50
Paolini, above n 13, 54.
51
Peterson, above n 5, 12.
52
See e.g. E Heinze, `Even Handedness and the Politics of Human Rights' (2008) 21Harvard Human
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to unite behind postcolonial discourses, they are now utilised to create hybrid
objectives that member states then collectively promote and support. Individu-
ally or in sub-groups, those same countries lack the power needed to challenge
dominant states and ideologies. As a bloc, they are able to pursue collective aims.
The hybrid constructs created within, and promoted by, political blocs reflect
the need for collective aims, forged through the hybridity process within the in-
ternational Third Space, in order to challenge dominant ideologies. The range
of heterogeneous identities within such blocs can be seen in the older alliances of
the Non-AlignedMovement and the Group of 7753—whose allegiances originally
stemmed from anti-imperialism and lack of alignment to the dominant powers—
as well as in the more recently created Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and
G7+.54 All of those blocs span at least three of the five geographic regions, which
enables formation of significant cross-regional alliances. Heterogeneity requires
objectives to be forged through a hybridity process, resulting in hybrid constructs
based on a mosaic of norms, cultures, values and experiences.
Movement away from post-colonialism and towards hybridity can be seen
through non-Western and non-dominant states using political blocs to promote
norms, values and cultures that go beyond the colonial experience. States
that previously were dominated by the West have constructed new identities
and ideologies based upon their own national identities and their collective
and individual experiences within the international arena. The Non-Aligned
Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have been at the fore of
promoting hybrid constructs of human rights based on non-Western and hybrid
ideologies. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation seeks to promote, amongst
others, Islamic values and ideologies,55 while the Non-AlignedMovement largely
focuses on collective objectives based on colonial experiences.
Hybrid human rights are based on hybrid identities, created through hybrid
processes and containing hybrid constructs. They are promoted through
`soft law' methods that circumvent the need for custom or treaties to create
Rights Journal 7.
53
G-77 was named at its creation in 1964, when 77 states jointly prepared for the UN Conference
on Trade and Development. It worked in parallel with NAM, focusing on economic issues. On
the relationship betweenNAM andG-77, see e.g. T GWeiss,What's Wrong with the United Nations
and How to Fix It (2008), 49.
54
G7+was formed by a group of fragile and conflict-affected states in order to provide amechanism
for focusing on and engaging with peacebuilding and statebuilding. The heterogeneous
group brings together states and international actors in order to facilitate development and
capacity-building.
55
Morgan-Foster, above n 9.
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international law. Those methods include political resolutions and decisions,
including at the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, through
the creation of Special Procedures mandates to monitor and report on these
`rights', and through integration of these norms at the international level. State
practice in this regard demonstrates the rise of hybridity and the movement away
from post-colonial discourses within the international human rights arena. This
brings with it a number of problems, not least: whether the human rights matrix
is the most appropriate for dealing with many of these new `rights'; the extent
to which hybrid rights are being used by states with poor human rights records
who seek to dilute or undermine the international human rights system; and
whether new `rights' ought to be developed where they are in clear tension, or
even conflict, with traditional understandings of what constitutes a `human right'.
As such, and owing to the little available literature on these new, hybrid rights,
it is necessary to explore whether there is room for hybrid constructs within
international human rights law.
4 Third Generation Rights
`Third Generation' terminology on human rights was first articulated by Vasak in
relation to collective rights, or those rights which could only be realised `by the
combined efforts of individuals, states, public and private associations, and the
international community.'56 Developed during the process of decolonisation,57
the first wave of Third Generation Rights can be seen as direct reactions to
different aspects of colonialism. Rather than those rights being rooted in
ideologies on human rights, they instead can trace their roots to the colonial
experience. The advent of the right to self-determination being realised and
implemented—that right being the oldest and most enshrined Third Generation
Right58—clearly is a direct reaction to colonialism and occupation. A peoples'
right to determine who governs over them does not represent a local or regional
ideology; rather, it is a collective response to each country's experience of
imperialism. The right to self-determination, then, represents neither a distinct
56
See e.g. K Vasak `Les différentes catégories des droits de l'homme' in T de Lapeyre & K Vasak
(eds), Les dimensions universelles des droits de l'homme (1990). Cf Donnelly, who insists that all
human rights require collective action for realisation; J Donnelly, `The Theology of the Right to
Development: A Reply to Alston' (1985) 15 California Western ILJ 521.
57
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ideology on human rights nor a hybrid construction of a third human rights
identity, but a reaction to subjugation and oppression and thus falls under the
post-colonial discourse. Similarly, the right to sovereignty over permanent
resources is another response to the collective experience of colonialism and
occupation, with the imperial powers having laid claim to the resources within
states under their control. Again, this right represents a postcolonial discourse
rather than having a distinct or hybrid ideology. States that had been formed
in response to, and out of the ashes of, colonisation sought to assert rights
to govern over themselves, as well as to economic and social development59
and to participate in and benefit from the common heritage of mankind.60
The first wave of Third Generation Rights was crucial to the decolonisation
process, enabling newly self-governing states to assert collective rights to matters
previously used by colonisers to subjugate and oppress those peoples.61
Recent events at UN bodies demonstrate that, in line with theories on
hybridity, Third Generation Rights are now being extended beyond postcolonial
discourses. That extension has occurred subsequent to many collective rights
becoming enshrined and implemented at the international, regional and local
levels and, perhaps more importantly, global politics shifting over the past two
decades. Significant changes have occurred within the international arena, not
least owing to: the end of the ColdWar; the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China
(BRIC); economic and other powers shifting away from being the sole preserve
of the West; and the increasing number of new political blocs representing
alliances between non-Western states. Those changes have enabled decolonised
and developing states to make their voices better heard at the international level.
The second wave of Third Generation Rights includes development of rights to a
democratic and equitable international order; to international solidarity; and to a
clean and healthy environment. Rather than being a response to imperialism and
based on post-colonial discourses, those rights are founded upon ideologies not
previously represented within international human rights law.
The newer `rights', at various stages in their development, reflect ideological
perspectives of a range of states that were unable to make their voices heard
during international human rights law's creation and development.62 However,
the rights are not representative simply of a `third' ideology, but rather of the
59
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many hybrid national identities and values constructed by states at the local level
and then intertwined with one another through the hybridity process within the
international arena. Each right represents the intertwining of a range of national
and regional—local—ideologies as well as the broad range of those states' colonial
experiences. It is that merging of ideologies and experiences that brings different
hybrid constructs to the fore within each new right. Each ideological construct
depends on the states that create and promote the right, their own human rights
objectives and values, and their experiences of the dominant, Western human
rights ideologies.
Hybridity can be seen in the ideologies underpinning these newer rights both
in terms of the substance and beneficiaries of those rights. Hybrid rights build
upon the idea of people's rights—incorporating collectiveness of people, nations
and states. They also develop the subject matter of human rights. Although
traditional rights touch upon areas linked to human rights, such as labour and
social justice, they are aimed largely at human rights as traditionally understood.
One interesting feature of the second wave of Third Generation Rights is that
some of them bring into the human rightsmatrixmatters that are linked to human
rights but would traditionally have been dealt with through other institutions. In
particular, issues that might better be addressed through environmental bodies
or financial institutions are being viewed through a human rights prism. This
may be owing to hybrid ideologies on human rights, with the use of Bhabha's
`Third Space' to construct new ways of thinking about what constitutes a `human
right' and whether such rights can exist within a vacuum. Another, more realist,
perspective is that other institutions are less effective than those within the
human rights matrix, and therefore states are using hybrid constructs to enable
such matters to be brought within the human rights matrix.
Third Generation Rights seek to challenge the dominant position in terms
of substance, subjects and scope. The second wave of rights moves that
challenge beyond the mosaic of post-colonial experiences and into national
and international Third Space constructions of human rights ideologies and
objectives.
`Substance' refers to the content of a right. Third Generation Rights challenge
the dominant, Western and Soviet ideologies on what constitutes a human right.
They bring hybrid constructs to the fore; that is, rights that are interdependent
on other subject areas that fall outside of the human rights matrix. The right to
a clean and healthy environment, for example, is not included in the core human
rights treaties but is enunciated in the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
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Rights;63 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;64 the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;65 and in `soft law'
documents including UN resolutions,66 reports, and the creation of a Special
Procedures mandate on the impact on human rights caused by dumping of toxic
and illicit waste.67 States from the Global South utilise the dominant human
rights language and framework in order to bring the environment—a distinct
subject area with its own institutions and mechanisms—into the human rights
matrix. Many hybrid rights are framed as human rights owing to their `impact
on other human rights'; describing them in such a way ensures that the rights are
viewed through a human rights prism. However, those so-called `human rights'
do not have a distinct or tangible substance that can be protected, nor do they
have tangible victimswhose `rights' may be violated. The rights are immeasurable
in terms of implementation. Yet, by framing the rights in this way they become
part of the human rights discourse. States, then, have utilised the international
Third Space to construct substantively hybrid rights that are informed by and
also challenge the dominant ideology.
Another way in which Third Generation Rights challenge the dominant ide-
ology on the substance of rights is through their increased focus on responsibili-
ties and duties rather than on rights. As with Civil and Political Rights and Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the substance of the first wave of Third Gen-
eration Rights focuses on the rights themselves. The right to self-determination
is framed in such a way as to focus the substance upon the right:
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.68
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The substance of that right focuses on the ways in which the right may be
realised. However, the substance of the newer Third Generation Rights moves
beyond focusing on granting individuals `freedom from' state interference or even
`freedom to' make demands upon a state, both of which enable the substance
of the right easily to be identified. Instead, the second wave Third Generation
Rights focuses on responsibilities of states, making it more difficult to identify
the tangible rights created by those obligations. The right to a democratic and
equitable international order demonstrates hybridity in the right's substance. The
resolution creating a Special Procedures mandate69 on the right to a democratic
and equitable international order sets out 16 substantive aspects of the right.70
Some of the substantive aspects focus on the right while others focus on states'
responsibilities, including: `[t]he shared responsibility of the nations of the world
for managing worldwide economic and social issues';71 `[t]he promotion and
consolidation of transparent, democratic, just and accountable international
institutions in all areas of cooperation';72 and `[t]he promotion of equitable
access to benefits from the international distribution of wealth through enhanced
international cooperation, in particular in international economic, commercial
and financial relations'.73 Hybridity here occurs through the substantive focus
oscillating between rights and responsibilities, resulting in a construct that
incorporates the polarised, and sometimes competing, ideologies from theGlobal
North and South.
The debate on `rights versus responsibilities' can clearly be seen in the
differences between the regional human rights systems. The African Charter
on Human and Peoples Rights74 was the first human rights treaty to set out
responsibilities alongside rights.75 That way of viewing human rights is rooted
in Africa's history and traditions and challenges the dominant, individual-focused
ideology. Themovement away from substantive focus on rights to the substantive
focus on responsibilities shows the impact of hybridity and the construction of
ideologies within the international Third Space. As states from the Global South
have grown stronger, they have become more able to construct and promote a
69
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second wave of Third Generation Rights that better reflects hybrid norms and
values that challenge the dominant ideology.
`Subjects' refers to who is bound by the human rights and to whom those
obligations are owed. Third Generation Rights have expanded the subject of
human rights both in terms of who, or what, are the rights holders and in terms
of who owes the obligations. A main criticism of Third Generation Rights is that,
unlike traditional rights, it is difficult to identify who would constitute a victim
if one of those rights were to be violated. In many ways, the subjects of these
newer rights are unclear, arguably owing to the focus being on responsibilities
rather than rights. As such, Third Generation Rights have markedly expanded
the subjects of rights.
The first wave of Third Generation Rights brought the idea of collective
and peoples' rights to the fore.76 Whereas previously almost all rights77 focused
on individuals,78 Third Generation Rights promote the idea of collective or
peoples' rights. By focusing on rights such as to self-determination, permanent
sovereignty over resources, and development, all of which may only be exercised
by peoples, Third Generation Rights expanded who or what could be classed as
rights holders. The second wave goes further, focusing on states as much as the
people who collectively make up a nation or a country. The right to international
solidarity and the right to a democratic and equitable order are aimed at states
as an entity—rather than a group of people—and at groups of states, as they
are collectives or groups of individuals. The Human Rights Council mandate
on international solidarity, for example, requires the Independent Expert `to
promote and consolidate international assistance to developing countries in their
endeavours in development and the promotion of conditions that make the full
realization of all human rights possible'.79 Although that responsibility discusses
the individual as the rights holder, it is only in relation to secondary rights
rather than to the right of international solidarity. It appears that states are
the primary rights holders and that the realisation of the right to international
solidarity will enable those rights holders—the states—to implement all human
rights for individuals under their control. This extends the subjects of rights
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beyond individuals as rights holders, bringing states under the umbrella of the
subjects to whom obligations are owed.
Expanding the subjects of rights from individuals to peoples and then to
states themselves is a radical challenge to the dominant ideology. This is
particularly true regarding Western notions of human rights, which focus solely
on individuals and where some scholars and states at times still resist the framing
of certain rights as `people's rights'. Intertwining states and individuals as subjects
and rights holders demonstrates hybridity—the construction of a new human
rights ideology that is based upon, but also challenges, the dominant ideology
while simultaneously incorporating norms and values of states from the Global
South.
The second challenge that Third Generation Rights present to the dominant
ideology's notion of the subjects of human rights is who owes the obligations con-
tained within the rights. The newer rights expand the traditional understandings
of who is bound by obligations. First, individuals and communities may be obli-
gated to facilitate the rights of others. For example, the Declaration on the Right
to Development says that `[a]ll human beings have a responsibility for develop-
ment, individually and collectively'.80 This is a radical shift away from individ-
uals solely being rights holders, and is rooted in African human rights ideolo-
gies.81 Secondly, states are made responsible for the behaviour of other states,
which uses the traditional human rights framework by building upon foundations
laid in the ICESCR82 whereby parties to that treaty are responsible for ensuring
the core minimum obligations within states that have exhausted their maximum
available resources.83 Although African and Asian states have demonstrated that
this type of collective responsibility on states for human rights realisation within
other states is part of their regional human rights ideology, the idea that states
ought to be responsible for rights being realised within other states, as opposed
to the narrower responsibility of violations being remedied, challenges the dom-
inant, Western ideology on human rights. Thirdly, other actors may be bound
by these obligations. Indeed, expansion of subjects is not just in relation to states
and individuals. The right to international solidarity seeks to encourage `more in-
80
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ternational actors […] to take initiatives towards international solidarity, and to
practice it in international relations.'84 This broad objective may lead to a range
of international actors being bound by obligations under this right, with the In-
dependent Expert insisting on the need to focus on relationships between states
and international actors.85 Again, the international Third Space has been used to
create a hybrid construct that expands the subjects of human rights in order to
represent hybrid ideologies.
`Scope' refers to where the rights apply and the area where a state is bound
by the obligations contained within a right. Traditional rights place obligations
upon states to respect, protect and fulfil the right.86 Generally, the scope of
those rights exists within territory where a state exercises control, although
there are some instances of extraterritorial applicability.87 Third Generation
Rights extend the scope of rights owing to their extension of the substance
and subjects of rights. The right to international solidarity, for example, seeks
to place responsibility on states for ensuring sufficient redistribution of wealth
to enable other states to have sufficient resources for human rights to be
realised within their territories. That scope goes beyond traditional territorial
and extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. Instead, human
rights become a collective responsibility of all states insofar as there is a global
responsibility to ensure that all states are able to implement human rights.
Throughout his reports, the Independent Expert on the right to international
solidarity emphasises that it places a responsibility on states:
International cooperation and solidarity are based on the concept
of shared responsibility. The notion of common but differentiated
responsibilities has potential value in the development of a right of
peoples and individuals to solidarity.88
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The concept of `shared responsibility' for ensuring that rights are able to be
realised within other countries' jurisdiction results in the scope of human rights
being extended beyond traditional understanding of where states owe their
obligations. The ideology underpinning shared responsibility goes beyond the
postcolonial idea that former imperial powers owe duties to former colonies, and
instead is rooted in African ideologies on responsibilities for other states and in
post-Marxist discourses on global inequalities. Indeed, drawing on what appears
to be post-Marxist theories the Independent Expert emphasises that `the duty
of solidarity [is] an imperative prerequisite of globalization.'89 Bringing these
hybrid ideologies into the human rights system using a human rights framework
enables states from the Global South effectively to challenge the dominant
understanding of the scope of human rights by requiring states to ensure the
primary right beyond their own jurisdiction in order to enable realisation of all
other human rights within other states' territories. The collective responsibility
that Third Generation Rights place on states results in the scope extending
to the transnational and international levels. The responsibilities placed on
states transcend national borders and are dependent on matters occurring at the
transnational and international levels.
5 Is there room for hybrid constructs within
international human rights law?
International human rights law is going through another evolutionary cycle with
development of new rights and, more broadly, the way that human rights operate
at the international level. Those changes are based on hybrid norms and values,
which give rise to hybrid rights that move beyond post-colonialism and challenge
the dominant human rights ideologies. Although hybrid rights are at various
stages in their development, with some still embryonic, they have significant
support from states across four of the five regional groups as well as the two
largest political blocs at the UN. Aspects of these hybrid rights, arguably, are
incompatible with, or overly expand, the human rights matrix that was largely
created by Western states. However, the West's current approach of claiming
that hybrid rights are not `rights' has failed to impact their creation, promotion
and development within the international arena. Therefore, it would be better,
from both the theoretical and practical perspectives, that these rights are explored
89
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and discussed at the theoretical as well as practical level in order to ensure
that the evolutionary process within the human rights system occurs in a more
systematic and less ad hoc manner. Understanding the theories underpinning
hybrid rights will enable those rights to develop in a way that enhances, rather
than undermines, the international human rights system.
Dominance of developing and decolonised states, alongside their allies within
political blocs, at the UN results in large numbers of states promoting or
supporting new Third Generation Rights. Even though not all states from Africa,
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean support all of the
rights, the cross-regional alliances through the Non-Aligned Movement and the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation mean that there are many potential allies
available to support new constructions of hybrid rights. Indeed, it is this hybridity
that enables each right to stem from subgroups of states that share common
values and cultures, or who use the international Third Space to intertwine their
national human rights ideologies and construct new rights based on those hybrid
norms. The sheer number of states involved with constructing these new rights
indicates that they will eventually be embedded within the human rights matrix,
regardless of their substance, through votes on non-binding international `soft
law' instruments that are later used as `proof' of the right's existence.
Hybrid rights, from a realist perspective, are a method for states to challenge
and assert their collective strength against the Global North. The objectives
behind the rightsmight be asmuch about anti-West political aims as about human
rights. Indeed, among the states promoting and supporting hybrid rights are
known human rights abusers, as well as states with autocratic or dictatorial
regimes. A realist perspective highlights that those states' motives cannot purely,
or even largely, be concerned with the realisation of human rights, owing to their
own poor records for implementing such rights. Arguably, those states are using
hybrid rights to dilute the system through rights expansion, which reduces the
available resources that can be devoted to any one right. Similarly, the system
is undermined by the expansion of what constitutes a right. Hybrid rights are
then used to challenge dominant states by shifting the focus away from protecting
tangible victims from tangible violations, instead using the human rights matrix
to attack Western states for broader concerns relating to global politics and
economics.
Although some states might be using the rights as a method to weaken,
dilute or undermine the human rights system, from an idealist perspective there
are strong ideological reasons for the construction of hybrid rights. The new
rights move beyond post-colonial discourses and represent hybrid ideologies,
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norms, values and cultures. Indeed, and as social constructivists might insist,
the new rights represent heterogeneous ideologies and values that were not
represented during the initial creation and development of international human
rights law. While they may take away finite resources for other rights, they
are also expanding the system and the way in which rights operate in order to
make international human rights law more relevant to more states. The rights
provide vehicles for realising other rights, and bring into the arena subject areas
that necessarily impact on rights. They also seek to ensure that responsibility
for rights implementation falls onto the international community as a whole.
While this may provide a smokescreen for abusers or allow states to avoid
responsibility for their own obligations, it also reflects the difficulties, as set out
by post-colonialists and post-Marxist theorists, of imposing Western constructs
on weaker and less developed states.
Regardless of the motivations for state behaviour in creating and promoting
hybrid rights—in-depth analysis of which goes beyond the scope of this article—
they are a significant development of the international human rights system. The
methods of creating these new rights, however, make that they are not yet en-
shrined in international human rights law to the same extent as traditional rights.
The West's lack of support for many hybrid rights means that they cannot be
created through traditional methods of treaties and customary international law.
States from the Global North simply would not consent to be bound by such laws.
Countries currently seeking to include their concepts of `rights' within the inter-
national framework instead promote these newer rights through resolutions90
and decisions91 at UN bodies and by creating new Special Procedures man-
dates.92 It is easier to secure a vote on resolutions, decisions, and newmandates—
especially at the UN Human Rights Council where the Non-Aligned Movement
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and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation dominate proceedings93—than to
secure agreement on a new international human rights treaty. Those methods
are then used as `soft law' to demonstrate the existence of a `right', as occurred
with the right to water.94 It is likely that the rights will continue to develop and
that, despite the lack of treaties and custom enshrining many hybrid rights, states
will be bound by the obligations contained therein.
The West's continued opposition to Third Generation Rights means that
Western states are unable to engage with, and thus influence, their development.
By allowing these rights to be constructed only by states from the Global South,
the West is perpetuating their potential abuse. It enables states seeking to divert
resources away from their ownmisconduct to do so, by overburdening the system
and shifting the focus away from ongoing abuses within their own territories.
Rather than dismissing these new rights, it would be better to understand the
ideologies underpinning these rights in order to understand how they will
affect the human rights system. Embracing hybridity as the current method of
developing international human rights law will provide an opportunity to ensure
that hybrid rights develop and are then implemented in such a way as to enable
better rights protection and promotion across the world. In that way, the human
right system will expand without being significantly undermined or diluted by
current developments.
The human rights community, particularly in the West, must make room
for hybridity theories and processes, even if it criticises some hybrid aspects
of the second wave of Third Generation Rights. The lessons that may be
learnt from classicists and political scientists is that top-down imposition of
ideologies through globalisation or universalism do not work, while postcolonial
or cultural relativist discourses fail to adequately address the issues raised within
the international arena. There must be room for ideologies that challenge the
dominant, through the construction of alternative narratives and discourses
based on heterogeneous norms values and cultures, as well as the experiences
and narratives of weaker states operating within the international arena. Caution
must be exercised, however, in allowing toomuch room for hybrid constructs that
seek to undermine rather than improve the international human rights system
and, more generally, international law. Hybridity must not be allowed to be
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used as a smokescreen to mask malignant intentions, particularly towards human
rights. There is a need to understand the development of new rights based on
hybrid constructs that move beyond post-colonial discourses and give a voice to
states that were previously unable to promote their ideologies on human rights.
However, human rights scholars must engage further with hybridity theories and
processes in order to identifywhen a right is hybrid andwhen the so-called hybrid
aspects are simply a way of seeking to undermine the human rights system.
